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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
NOTICE AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT
TO BRINGING ACTION
Notice, by the plaintiff to the defendant, as a condition prece-
dent to an action against the defendant is, in some cases, expressly
required by statute. In the absence of statute, and at common
law, the necessity of notice depended upon the particular case.
Generally, as is stated in the contract action of Lent vs. Padelford,
io Mass. 425, it is not necessary to give notice to the defendant,
prior to bringing the action, when the facts of the case are equally
within the knowledge of the plaintiff and the defendant. Nor is
it necessary, when the defendant has other means of informing
himself of the facts, even though such means are not as adequate
or expedient.
No one is bound by law to notify another of that which that
other may otherwise inform himself, Lamphere vs. Cowen, 24 Vt.
I75. On the other hand; when the party stipulates to do a thing,
or where the facts relied upon are within the peculiar and exclu-
sive knowledge of the plaintiff, then notice ought to be given to
the defendant. Hayden vs. Bradley, 66 Am. D. 42I. Likewise
in Whitton vs. Whitton, 38 New Hampshire 127, the court says
that the "law implies that notice will be given, where the condi-
tion depends upon the act of the person claiming its benefit, of
every material circumstance connected with it which is within
the party's peculiar and personal konwledge, or which depends
upon his choice, and where the other party has no other means of
arriving at that knowledge except from the party himself." These
general principles apply, not only to contract actions, but to other
actions as well.
In actions of damages for injury to the person or to property,
the plaintiff need not ordinarily give notice, in the absence of
statute, before being entitled to bring action. As was held in
the Alabama case of Railway Co. vs. Wildman, 24 So. 548, a pas-
senger injured by a carrier need not notify the carrier before
bringing action. Nor is it necessary that one, whose cellar drain
has been injured, should give notice of the injury to the party
responsible, before commencing suit to recover damages, Ohio &
M. Ry. C. vs. Hemberger, 43 Ind. 462. However, deviations
from this rule will be noticed with changes in the circumstances,
as are evidenced in the flood cases discussed in 59 L. R. A. 903.
There the case of Eastman vs. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 New
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Hampshire 143, arrives at the conclusion that the necessity of
notice, prior to action, should depend upon whether or not the
flooding was by permission of the grantor, and if it was, justice
requires notice; while if the flowage was adverse no notice would
be necessary. Nor would the law require such notice to abate
the flooding as a nuisance and charge the person who built and
maintained the dam with the unlawful flowage such dam caused,
merely because the land was in the meantime conveyed. But
the case of Pickett vs. Condon, i8 Md. 412, does require notice
prior to an action of damages for injury caused to an upper mill
by back water from a lower dam, by one who purchased the up-
per mill subsequent to the building of the dam, against the grantee
of the erector of the dam. But since both parties in this case
were not the parties to the original unlawful flowage, the case
seems to follow the foregoing general principles in reference to
knowledge of possible peculiar facts. These principles practically
cover the general law on notice, excepting agreements between
the parties, rules of court and statutory enactment.
The question of whether or not agreements between the parties
can make notice a condition precedent depends upon the laws of
the particular jurisdiction, as to the reasonableness and consequent
validity of the particular stipulation. And even where the stipu-
lation is adjudged valid, there is a diversity of opinion whether
the notice provided for becomes a condition precedent. The
weight of authority is, that if the agreement is valid, the stipula-
tion as to notice is a condition precedent and the performance
must be alleged or proved by the plaintiff to entitle him to recover.
Some states hold that, unless it is pleaded that notice was given
as required by the contract, there is no cause of action, 17 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 624. Thus, in the Texas case of Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. Ry. Co. vs. Thompson, 97 S. W. 459, 7 L. R. A. (N. S) 191,
which was an action of damages against an employer, the court
in its discussion of the conflict of laws, came to the conclusion
that notice of injury must be given, if a stipulation requiring one
is given in the contract, unless the stipulation is adjudged un-
reasonable and therefore void by the constitution of the particu-
lar state. And in Chicago & A. Ry. Co. vs. Simms, 18 Ill. App.
68, which was an action for loss by the carrier of the shipper's
goods, the court held that the plaintiff could not recover where
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he failed to prove the giving of notice, having by special contract
made notice of loss within a specified time a condition precedent.
Where statutory provision requires notice to be given before
commencing the action, the terms of the statute usually denote
the nature of the requirement. Generally, such requirement makes
notice "a condition precedent to the right and an essential element
of the case of action," Denver Ry. Co. vs. Wagner, 167 Fed. 75.
But some states construe these statutory requirements to be,
not a condition precedent upon the right to sue, but merely a
limitation upon the remedy. Prior to these particular provi-
sions, the party injured had a certain length of time to bring
action before the statute of limitations acted as a bar. This
enabled claims to be brought after long delays, and after evi-
dence was lost and witnesses could no longer be found; thus
often it was almost impossible for the party sued to defend
himself.
The provision requiring notice cured this mischief. It required
the plaintiff to inform the defendant, within a specified time, of
the plaintiff's intent and afforded the defendant the just oppor-
tunity to investigate and preserve his evidence, Malloy vs. C. &
N. W. Ry. Co., xo9 Wis. 29. In those states where no specified
time was prescribed by the statute .the notice had to be served
within a reasonable time, and after notice was given, the plain-
tiff was not deprived of the usual statutory period within which
to commence his action, but the defendant was given the just
opportunity to protect himself. This, it was said in some cases,
was the primary purpose of the provision and therefore notice
could be waived, if the complaint was actually served and the
action started within the time required for the service of the
notice, Welsh vs. Barber Asphalt Co., 167 Fed. 465.
But even those states which expressly state or construe such
service of notice to be an absolute requirement and a condition
precedent, allow provisions for the waiving of the notice, Penin-
sular Stove Co. vs. Osman, 73 Mich. 570, 41 N. W. 693. And
this seems to be the rule when the complaint is filed and the ac-
tion is actually commenced within the time required for the serv-
ice of notice, or when voluntary appearance is made in court by
the parties. As a general rule then, notice is required, to be
served within the time prescribed or within a reasonable time,
only when the party sues or intends to sue after the expiration
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of the time required for such service by statute, or after such
reasonable time, but within the time prescribed by the statute of
limitations. Siebert v. Dudenhoefer Co., (Wis.) i88 N. W. 6io.
In Wisconsin, notice, as a condition precedent to bringing ac-
tion, is expressly provided for by statute. Section 4o2 (5) R. S.,
which follows Ch. 3o4, Laws of 19o7, refers to injuries to the
person and requires a notice in writing. Such notice must be
signed by the party bringing the action, his agent or attorney,
and must be served upon the party or corporation responsible for
the damage, in the manner provided for the service of summons,
within two years after the happening of the event complained
of. It must state the time and place of the happening of the event,
a brief description of the injuries and how received, the grounds
of the claim and a claim for satisfaction. This section further
expressly provides for a waiver of such notice, if the action is
brought and a complaint actually served within the two years
required for the service of such notice.
In Gatzow vs. Buening, io6 Wis. I, 89 N. W. IOO3, this sec-
tion was held to be applikable to bodily injuries only. Lawton vs.
Waite, 103 Wis. 244, 79 N. W. 331, which accrued before the
passage of the act, construed the requirement of notice, in effect,
to be a provision of limitation and not a condition precedent to
the commencement of the action. However, the later case of
Klingbeil vs. Saucerman, 165 Wis. 6o, i6o N. W. io5i, which
was an action of malpractice for the infliction of bodily injuries,
decided that the notice required by this section, was a "condition
precedent to the maintenance of an action to recover damages for
an injury to the person," whether the action be in tort or on con-
tract. See also Siebert v. Dudenhoefer Co. But, by the terms of
the statute, such right of notice can be waived by the actual service
of the complaint and the commencement of the action within the
time limited for the giving of notice, Hoffman vs. Milw. E. R. &
L. Co. 127 Wis. 76, io6 N. W. 8o. Hence, an irregular or in-
sufficient notice, served within the time limit and acted upon by
the party without requiring another notice or returning the faulty
one, will serve as a waiver by the party receiving the notice.
Maurer vs. N. TV. Iron Co., 151 Wis. 172, 138 N. W. 636.
Another class of actions, which requires notice before com-
mencement, is that of actions against railroad companies for in-
jury to property by fire from locomotives, or for damages for
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
stock killed or injured by the company. Section i8i6b R. S., pro-
vides that such actions cannot be maintained unless notice in
writing, signed by the owner of the property or his agent or at-
torney, is served upon the corporation within one year after the
happening of the injury complained of, in the manner provided
for the service of summons. Such notice must contain the time
and place where such damage occurred and a claim for satisfaction
This section also contains a waiver clause, eliminating necessity
of notice if the action is brought within the time specified for the
service of such notice.
This statute was added by the joint committee in 1898. Its re-
quirement of service is mandatory, but the method of service
is permissive merely. The service must be made on the defend-
ant corporation and in its name, and service on a claim agent
is insufficient and invalid, Smith vs. Chicago etc., Ry. Co., 124
Wis. i1o, io2 N. W. 336. Still, an earlier case held that delivery
on the general claim agent of the defendant was a sufficient and
valid notice. Atkinson vs. Chicago etc. Ry., 93 Wis. 362, 67
N. W. 703.
In all the earlier cases and including, Ryan vs. Chi. & N. W.
Ry. Co., IOI Wis. o6, 77 N. W. 894, the notice of this section
was held to be a condition precedent to the bringing of the action;
but after Meisenheimer vs. Kellog, io6 Wis. 30, construed Sec.
4222 (5), R. S., to be a limitation on the remedy merely, the sub-
sequent cases in construing Sec. i8i6b R. S., followed, and held
in addition that the allegation of the service of the notice was un-
essential and unnecessary, Mallory vs. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., io9
Wis. 29, 85 N. W. 130. However, since Klingbeil vs. Saucerman,
supra, has reconstrued Sec. 4222 (5) R. S., to be a condition
precedent, no doubt the provision concerning the railroad cor-
poration cases will be likewise reconstrued to follow the earlier
condition precedent doctrine.
Another particular requirement of notice is provided for in
Section 1339 R. S., for actions maintained against counties, town,
cities or villages for injuries sustained to person or property and
caused by defects in or failure to repair highways and bridges.
In such actions the notice must be served upon the mayor or city
clerk in the case of a city, within fifteen days after the happening
of the injury complained of; and in the case of counties, towns
or villages, within thirty days after the injury, upon the super-
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visor of a town, or the county clerk, or one of the trustees of a
village. The body of it must state the place of damage; a de-
scription generally of the injury sustained and of the defect or lack
of repair; and a claim for satisfaction. This section does not
contain a waiver clause. Soon after the passage of this act the
constitutionality of this provision was attacked, but the court
held it was not unconstitutional as placing an unreasonably short
limit for the service of notice of injuries; or because of the dif-
ference between the limitation in the case of cities and towns,
Daniels vs. Racine, 98 Wis.- 649, 74 N. W. 553.
This notice is not merely a proceeding in an action, but is an
essential preliminary to its commencement. Proof that it was
given must be made and a complaint wherein it is not alleged is
fatally defective. Schroth vs. Prescott, 63 Wis. 652, 24 N. W.
405. However, a general allegation that the required notice is-
sued within the prescribed time is sufficient, Cairncross vs. Pe-
waukee, 78 Wis. 66; and the notice itself, in any action, is com-
petent evidence to prove its service, McDonald vs. Ashland, 78
Wis. 251, 47 N. W. 434.
As to the contents of the notice itself, the constructions are
liberal. In giving the time, place and description of the injury,-
all that is required to make the notice valid, is good. faith with
no intent to deceive or mislead. And even inaccuracy in descrip-
tion of the place of the injury, if it does not mislead the adverse
party, will not invalidate the notice, Redepennin.q vs. Town of
Rock, 136 Wis. 372.
It is necessary that the notice be given in behalf of the plain-
tiff. In McKeague vs. Green Bay, io6 Wis. 577, 82 N. W. 708,
where the wife gave notice of her injuries, stating that she would
claim satisfaction, the court held that this notice was insufficient
for an action by her husband for loss of services. Prior to this
decision the rule was otherwise and two actions by two different
persons for the same injury could be brought on one notice of
injury, as in the case of a minor and his father, Reed vs. Madison,
83 Wis. I7I, 53 N. W. 547.
The statutory provision admits of no exceptions, but its terms.
do not apply to damages resulting from the obstruction of a
navigable river by reason of the insufficiency or want of repair
of a bridge, Weisenberg vs. Winneconne, 56 Wis. 24, 43 N. W.
656. Nor do they apply to defeat the action of an administrator
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where the party injured died within the time allowed for the serv-
ice of the notice, and no notice had been served, McKeague vs.
Janeszfille, 68 Wis. 50, 31 N. W. 298. It was held not to be nec-
essary to serve it upon a defendant who obstructed a street and
was sued with the municipality, Cairncross vs. Pewaukee, 86 Wis.
I81, 56 N. W. 648. But this decision was overruled by a later
case, where it appeared that a private corporation also was liable
because it was responsible for the defective condition of the
street; such notice of injury upon the municipality did not oper-
ate as a notice to the corporation. Uhlenburg vs. Milw. Gas Light
CO., 138 Wis. 148, 119 N. W. 8io. In no case need the service
of notice be personal, and the mailing thereof is sufficient, Small
vs. Prentice, 102 Wis. 256, 78 N. W. 475.
These principles practically cover the statutory law in this
State, on notice before bringing of action. They abrogate the com-
mon law in that the majority of the cases coming within their pur-
view consist of facts which are, ab initio, within the knowledge and
even equal knowledge of both parties. In summary then, notice
of injury before action is a condition precedent in Wisconsin
only in the following cases. i. Where the plaintiff sustains in-
jury to his person, whether in tort or contract, and the defendant
is either a corporation or a private person, the plaintiff must
serve a written notice of his injury within two years after its
happening. Sec. 4222 (5) R. S. 2. Where the plaintiff sus-
tains injury to his property by fire from locomotives, or to his
livestock,.and the defendant is a railroad corporation, the plaintiff
must serve the written notice of the injury within one year after
its occurrence. Sec. 18i6b R. S. 3. Where the plaintiff sustains
injury to his person or property because of defects in or lack
of repair of highways and bridges and the defendant is a munici-
pality, the plaintiff must serve his written notice of injury upon
the proper official, within fifteen days in the case of a city and
thirty days in case of a county, town or village. Sec. 1339. R. S.
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